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Firms support welfare provision in various ways. First, ﬁrms help ﬁ-
nance social security beneﬁts by contributing to social insurance pro-
grams, such as public pensions, unemployment compensation, and med-
ical care. Second, ﬁrms organize and manage their own systems of welfare
provision for their employees. Typical examples are enterprise pensions (or
occupational pensions) and health insurance systems. Third, ﬁrms provide
their employees with housing services and other nonstatutory welfare ser-
vices directly. The third form is typically observed in large Japanese ﬁrms.
The distinction between direct and indirect methods of welfare provi-
sion is particularly important. An indirect method implies that ﬁrms con-
tribute to both employees and citizens who are anonymous from the ﬁrm’s
point of view. An example is a social insurance system, where ﬁrms are un-
able to identify who the actual beneﬁciaries are. Firms simply contribute
to a social insurance fund. Of course, employees also contribute to social
insurance systems. A direct method implies that ﬁrms contribute directly
and exclusively to their own employees. Thus, ﬁrms can identify the actual
beneﬁciaries of the welfare provision because they support only their em-
ployees. Typical examples are enterprise pensions, health insurance sys-
tems, and housing services. An interesting question is whether such direct
and indirect methods have diﬀerent eﬀects on workers’ behavior, welfare
systems’ management, or ﬁrms’ economic performance.
In principle, there are three groups that ﬁnance welfare provision. They
are (a) fellow citizens, like employees and the self-employed; (b) ﬁrms; and
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versity.(c) the public sector (i.e., general tax revenues). Fellow citizens and ﬁrms
can contribute in various ways, as indicated previously for ﬁrms. The
public sector can also contribute in various ways. Some countries, like
Denmark, rely largely on general tax revenues to provide welfare services,
whereas other countries, like Japan and the United States, do not rely heav-
ily on general tax revenues. Why are there diﬀerences across countries?
11.2 International Comparisons
It is useful to review current international methods for providing social
and welfare services, and in particular how welfare services are provided by
the public sector. In other words, what is the magnitude of welfare provi-
sion, and the distribution of taxes or social security contributions to sup-
port it, in each country? Tables 11.1 and 11.2 present social expenditures
and tax revenue and social security contribution rates, respectively, for sev-
eral advanced countries. I focus largely on Japan and the United States.
The statistics in these tables are shown as percentage shares of gross do-
mestic product (GDP).
The tables highlight a remarkable fact: Japan and the United States have
the lowest shares of social expenditure and the lowest burden of taxes and
social security contributions among the advanced countries, suggesting
that the public sector does not provide a large amount of welfare services.
The rates of social expenditure in Japan and the United States in 1993 were
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Table 11.1 Social Expenditures (% GDP)
1980 1985 1990 1993 1994
Austria 22.3 24.0 23.6 25.6 n.a.
Belgium 25.4 28.2 26.4 27.2 n.a.
Denmark 27.6 26.5 28.2 31.0 n.a.
Finland 18.9 23.5 25.3 34.8 34.1
France 23.5 27.0 26.0 28.7 n.a.
Germany 25.8 26.5 24.8 29.8 n.a.
Greece 10.8 16.2 17.1 16.9 n.a.
Ireland 19.7 23.3 19.3 21.3 20.7
Italy 18.4 21.7 23.1 25.0 n.a.
Luxembourg 24.8 24.6 23.9 25.3 n.a.
The Netherlands 28.5 28.9 29.2 30.5 n.a.
Portugal 11.6 11.9 14.4 17.5 n.a.
Spain 16.5 18.7 19.8 22.5 n.a.
Sweden 28.9 30.4 31.6 37.5 n.a.
United Kingdom 18.7 21.5 20.2 24.0 n.a.
United States 12.7 12.9 13.8 15.3 n.a.
Japan 10.2 11.3 11.2 12.5 13.0
Source: OECD (1998).
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































e12.5 percent and 15.3 percent, respectively, much lower than the rate of the
average European country. The rates of government revenue for both
countries were below 30 percent in 1993, again much lower than the aver-
age rate among European countries. The public sector in Japan and the
United States does not play an important role in welfare provision.
Very high shares of social expenditure, tax revenues, and social security
contributions are observed in Scandinavian countries like Denmark, Fin-
land, and Sweden, which are known as welfare states. The public sector
plays a very important welfare provision role in these countries. Tables 11.1
and 11.2 suggest that both Japan and the United States are representative
examples of nonwelfare states.
Tachibanaki (2000b) provides an extensive discussion of the reasons why
Japan is a nonwelfare state. The paper emphasizes the roles of both family
and ﬁrms in welfare provision, which diminish the role of the public sector.
Rein (1996) stresses that focusing only on the state leads to an underesti-
mate of the level of social protection in society, suggesting that the United
States is not the exceptional case of a welfare laggard. Welfare is provided
not only by the public sector in the United States, but also by individuals
and enterprises, as represented by health insurance programs and enter-
prise pension systems.
Scandinavian countries are the other extreme because they are welfare
states, with welfare levels much higher than that of the United States. Also,
the income distribution is much more equal in Scandinavia, for the follow-
ing two reasons: First, pretransfer income is more equally distributed. Sec-
ond, a stronger redistributive policy through tax and social security sys-
tems is in place. Freeman, Topel, and Swedenborg (1997) have published
an interesting book about the diﬀerence between the American and
Swedish views on the welfare state.
What is the role of ﬁrms in welfare provision? Figure 11.1presents a time
series of the contributions of ﬁrms to social security. Figure 11.2 presents
the shares of social security funding, including those of beneﬁciaries’ con-
tributions and tax revenues, for several countries. These ﬁgures were pub-
lished by Katsumata and Morita (1999) and Katsumata (2000).
They show several interesting results regarding the role of ﬁrms in wel-
fare provision. First, both Sweden and France have very high rates of con-
tributions by ﬁrms. About two-thirds of total social security costs are
borne by ﬁrms in Sweden, and about half in France. It is interesting to note
that Denmark, which is one of the welfare states, is quite diﬀerent from
Sweden. The role of the ﬁrm is very minor in Denmark: Seventy percent of
social security ﬁnancing comes from general tax revenues. Thus, there are
diﬀerences even within Scandinavia regarding the ﬁnancial sources of wel-
fare provision.
Second, the ﬁrm contribution shares for Germany, Japan, the United






















































































































































































































































































)cent. The contributions of ﬁrms to welfare provision are modest in these
countries. If we rank these countries according to the role of ﬁrms, Ger-
many ranks highest, followed by the United Kingdom, Japan, and the
United States. It is again striking that both Japan and the United States are
at the bottom for this measure.
Despite the fact that ﬁrm contributions to welfare provision play a mi-
nor role in both Japan and the United States, there are diﬀerences between
the two countries. Japanese ﬁrms, in particular larger ﬁrms, make fairly
signiﬁcant contributions in the form of nonstatutory fringe beneﬁts.
American ﬁrms contribute to enterprise pensions and health insurance
systems that are not managed by the public sector. The Japanese nonstatu-
tory fringe beneﬁt system will be discussed below.
Third, it is necessary to understand why several European countries like
France, Germany, and Sweden have high rates of ﬁrm contributions to so-
cial security. For Germany, it is widely known that the Bismarckian social
insurance system encouraged ﬁrms to contribute to social security along
with workers in order to enhance worker productivity. This is sometimes
called a carrot-and-stick policy, and it led the Prussian society and econ-
omy into the Industrial Revolution. It is the origin of a social policy that
was popular both before and after World War II. It is ironic that German
social policy was applauded by the Marxist school of economics in this pe-
riod in Japan. It has, to a certain extent, dominated Japan’s labor and so-
cial security policy during the postwar period. It is not an exaggeration to
say that welfare policy in Japan followed the tradition of social policy in
Germany and that this is still reﬂected in the current system, although
there have been modiﬁcations.
For France, there are two possible explanations. First, there is a tradition
of social insurance systems that are delineated by occupation, ﬁrm, or
both. Each occupational group or ﬁrm has its own separate social insur-
ance system. In such a case, ﬁrms are normally willing to contribute more
to employees because they can expect high employee motivation in return.
Second, the French trade union movement has been fairly strong, and thus
it has had a strong voice to use against employers during the postwar pe-
riod. It is not surprising that ﬁrms have to accept a high share of social in-
surance costs under such circumstances. It is, nevertheless, necessary to
take into consideration the incidence of ﬁrms’ contributions to social in-
surance in France in order to draw a clear conclusion concerning the above
two forces.
For Sweden, a story similar to that of France can be applied to explain
the high contributions of ﬁrms. Trade unions, in particular blue-collar
unions, have been fairly powerful. Additionally, the welfare state has re-
ceived wide support. Thus, all economic agents, including ﬁrms, have been
willing to contribute to welfare provision.
The Role of Firms in Welfare Provision 32111.3 Japan
Having examined international statistics, my next task is to evaluate the
contribution of ﬁrms to welfare provision in Japan. There are basically
four important components of ﬁrms’ contributions to welfare. The ﬁrst is
statutory contributions to social security, which account for about 50 per-
cent of nonwage labor payments. The second is nonstatutory fringe bene-
ﬁts. The third is retirement allowances (or severance payments). The resid-
ual fourth is the sum of payments toward real goods, expenditures on
education and training for employees, hiring costs, and so forth.
Table 11.3 shows the share of each component as a fraction of total la-
bor costs. The largest share is that of statutory contributions to social se-
curity, about 8 to 10 percent. The second largest share is accounted for by
severance payments, and the third is due to nonstatutory fringe beneﬁts.
Table 11.3 reveals signiﬁcant diﬀerences in nonwage payments by ﬁrm size.
This is particularly true in the case of retirement allowances (severance
payments) and nonstatutory fringe beneﬁts, whereas there is no diﬀerence
in statutory contributions to social security. The diﬀerences in severance
payments and nonstatutory fringe beneﬁts can be explained by the “ability
to pay” hypothesis: Larger ﬁrms are able to oﬀer higher severance pay-
ments and nonstatutory fringe beneﬁts than smaller ﬁrms, due to their ex-
tra revenues. This is probably the most salient feature about ﬁrms’ contri-
butions to welfare provision in Japan.
How large are the diﬀerences by ﬁrm size? Table 11.4 gives the answer.
First, the largest diﬀerence is for housing payments. Larger ﬁrms have their
own housing facilities for married households and dormitories for singles.
Employees can live in these facilities and pay very low rents because they
are heavily subsidized by the ﬁrms. The higher payments for housing by
larger ﬁrms reﬂect the amounts of the subsidies and the purchase costs of
these houses and dormitories. Overall, expenditures on housing account
for over 46 percent of nonstatutory fringe beneﬁts. This is by far the high-
est share of any component of these beneﬁts. However, this share varies
substantially by ﬁrm size. Firms with over 5,000 employees pay an average
of 23,600 yen per month, per employee, whereas ﬁrms with thirty to
ninety-nine employees pay only 6,900 yen per month per employee. There-
fore, the payments per employee by large ﬁrms are about 3.4 times those by
small ﬁrms. Payments are probably near zero for the smallest ﬁrms, but
there are no data with which to conﬁrm this conjecture.
Second, table 11.4 suggests that ﬁrms in Japan pay amazingly varied
types of fringe beneﬁts, including payments for cultural and athletic facil-
ities, congratulations and condolences, food, and so on. These payments
are sometimes called East Asian types of fringe beneﬁts.
The results in tables 11.3 and 11.4 document extraordinary diﬀerences










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.ments and nonstatutory fringe beneﬁts. Tachibanaki (1996), Tachibanaki
and Taki (2000), and Tachibanaki and Noda (2000) discuss the dual struc-
ture of the Japanese labor market, which implies a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in
wages, productivity, employment stability, union behavior, and the like by
ﬁrm size. Severance payments and nonstatutory fringe beneﬁts are no ex-
ceptions to this dual structure.
Table 11.5 shows how ﬁrms’ statutory contributions to social security
are distributed. The highest share, nearly 53 percent, is paid to public pen-
sion programs. An additional 32 percent is contributed to health insur-
ance, and 14 percent goes to unemployment insurance and labor casualty
insurance. Historically, the role of unemployment compensation has been
minor, due to the low rate of unemployment. This is no longer true in light
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Table 11.4 Components of Nonstatutory Fringe Beneﬁts (%)
Firm Size
Total 5,000+ 1,000–4,999 300–999 100–299 30–99
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Housing 46.3 49.6 54.1 51.8 33.8 19.4
Medical insurance 5.6 7.9 4.7 3.5 4.7 3.3
Food 10.6 9.8 9.4 10.4 12.7 14.8
Culture and athletics 8.6 8.1 7.1 7.8 9.9 14.1
Private insurance 8.4 3.2 6.8 9.3 14.6 22.5
Additional casualty 
payments 1.7 0.4 0.6 2.1 3.9 5.8
Congratulations and 
condolences 3.4 2.7 3.7 3.2 4.0 4.8
Aid to savings 3.9 6.0 3.3 3.1 2.4 1.3
Other 11.6 12.3 10.3 8.7 13.9 13.9
Amount per month 
per employee (yen) 13,682 23,601 17,439 11,317 8,069 6,907
Source: Ministry of Labor (1997).










Source: Ministry of Labor (1997).of the fact that the unemployment rate reached over 5 percent in 2003.
Nevertheless, public pensions and health insurance account for the vast
majority of ﬁrms’ contributions to social security.
11.4 Theory
This section presents economic theories to explain the considerably high
share of nonwage payments, particularly nonstatutory fringe beneﬁts.
It is crucial to understand that a large part of fringe beneﬁts, such as pay-
ments to private retirement systems (including severance payments), life
insurance systems, health beneﬁts, and other agreed-upon plans, are de-
ferred compensation. The intrinsic nature of deferred compensation is
the main reason for both employers’ and employees’ preferences for fringe
beneﬁts, although factors that are not associated with deferred payments
must also be examined.
Rice (1966) gives four factors for explaining the growth of fringe bene-
ﬁts in the United States: (a) preferential treatment under federal personal
income tax laws; (b) savings that are made possible by group purchase of
some beneﬁts, notably insurance; (c) eﬀorts to reduce turnover in the face
of rising costs of labor turnover; and (d) unionization. Woodbury (1983)
adds three factors: (e) preferential treatment under federal corporate in-
come taxes, since contributions by employers to pension funds and insur-
ance beneﬁts are largely deductible from employers’ taxable income; (f) the
changing age composition of the labor force; and (g) the eﬀect of rising in-
come. Hart (1984) provides a useful survey of these results for the 1960s to
early 1980s and analyzes nonwage labor costs.
These factors have been scrutinized recently in an attempt to interpret
the rationales behind the payment of fringe beneﬁts, and new factors have
been added. I summarize them under the following ﬁve headings: (a)
agency theory; (b) tax advantage theory; (c) worker preference; (d) cost
savings apart from tax advantages; and (e) better industrial relations.
These are mainly factors explaining the levelof fringe beneﬁts. However, by
reinterpreting them, I may also use them to explain the growth of fringe
beneﬁts. I discuss each in turn.
11.4.1 The Agency Model
This model was developed by Lazear (1979, 1981) as an extension of that
of Becker (1964). The fundamental idea of this model is that the optimal
age-earnings strategy for a ﬁrm is to pay workers less than their marginal
value product in their early years with the ﬁrm and more in their later years.
There are several reasons for this strategy. First, an employee who has re-
ceived costly training may quit before the ﬁrm has recouped the cost of
training or may engage in a suboptimal level of shirking. Lazear empha-
sized the importance of deferred compensation to increase the employee’s
The Role of Firms in Welfare Provision 325opportunity cost of quitting or shirking, with its attendant prospects of be-
ing discharged. Second, fringe payments may increase workers’ productiv-
ity directly. Third, and somewhat contrary to the second view, Medoﬀ and
Abraham (1980) ﬁnd that productivity grows far less than is proportionate
to earnings with length of service in the ﬁrm. If this ﬁnding is true, a steeper
age-earnings proﬁle would increase a worker’s incentive to shirk.
Several reservations may be raised about agency theory. First, the model
refers implicitly to total labor compensation rather than to fringe beneﬁts
only. Second, the causal mechanism is not entirely clear. Third, some em-
pirical evidence on the diﬀerence in working hours between younger work-
ers and older workers contradicts the theory. Fourth, it is not easy to distin-
guish between human capital theory and agency theory using wage data.
11.4.2 Tax Advantage Theory
Tax advantage theory oﬀers three basic arguments. The ﬁrst is based on
the fact that most forms of nonwage compensation are not taxed as in-
come. Standard microeconomic theory leads us to conjecture that em-
ployers could reduce compensation costs without reducing employee util-
ity by oﬀering compensation packages that contain untaxed, nonwage
employee beneﬁts. This provides employers with an incentive to raise the
amount of nonwage compensation.
Second, and somewhat related to the argument of the agency model,
Mumy (1985) has shown that deferred payment has a clear advantage when
payroll taxes, social security beneﬁts, and income taxes are taken into ac-
count. The reason is as follows: When wage income is deferred, the present
value of payroll taxes on the income declines. In addition, this wage income
later enters the calculation of average earnings for social security payments
in an undiscounted manner. In other words, the social security and payroll
tax systems provide incentives to defer compensation early in working
life, thus avoiding payroll taxes and allowing pension beneﬁts to accrue.
The concentration of compensation later in life raises the average earnings
base for social security beneﬁts. Again, the same reservations expressed for
agency theory are applicable here.
Third, corporate tax laws favor employer contributions to social security
and pension funds because of deductibility from employers’ taxable income.
In sum, the tax advantage model is quite promising for interpreting the
rapid growth of nonwage labor costs and, in particular, pensions. A nice
example of the relevance of this theory is provided by the rapid growth in
enterprise pension systems, such as 401(k)s, in the United States (e.g.,
Poterba, Venti, and Wise 1994).
11.4.3 Worker Preference
A large number of empirical studies such as Freeman (1981), Lester
(1967), and Woodbury (1983) ﬁnd that unionized ﬁrms provide a higher
326 Toshiaki Tachibanakiproportion of total compensation in the form of fringe beneﬁts than
nonunionized ﬁrms. One exception is Reynolds (1974). Since the union
places a greater weight on the preferences of older workers and permanent
workers, who are likely to prefer deferred compensation such as health in-
surance and pensions over wages, unionized ﬁrms tend to have higher pro-
portions of fringe beneﬁts. This argument is an application of the median
voter model advocated by Freeman and Medoﬀ (1979). See Tachibanaki
and Noda (2000) on Japanese unions that prefer such arrangements. The
fact that large Japanese ﬁrms have reacted positively to their unions’ pref-
erences is interesting.
It must be noted, however, that although the theory of union preference
is reasonably persuasive, we have to oﬀer an adequate explanation for why
nonunionized ﬁrms prefer fringe beneﬁts in some countries and why highly
unionized countries, such as Germany and Sweden, have low rates of vol-
untary, nonwage labor costs.
The case of Germany and Sweden is not complicated. These countries
have a higher rate of statutory social welfare programs, and thus the ne-
cessity of nonstatutory social programs is greatly reduced. It would be in-
teresting, however, to investigate whether relying more heavily on statutory
or nonstatutory social welfare programs is more eﬃcient.
The case of nonunionized ﬁrms is not as simple. The tax advantage
model may provide an adequate explanation. Both employers and employ-
ees may agree to raise the share of deferred payments in order to take ad-
vantage of the favorable tax treatment of these payments. It is possible that
ﬁrms also pay fringe beneﬁts on a purely voluntary basis outside of the sys-
tem of collective bargaining to secure employees’ loyalty.
11.4.4 Cost Savings apart from Tax Advantages
A specialized agent, like an insurance company, can oﬀer insurance for
a low charge. Each employee’s costs are reduced if a large number of work-
ers can form a group insurance program with the consent of an employer.
Management costs of pensions and insurance programs can also be re-
duced if employers and their employees administer, monitor, and evaluate
their programs collectively. These cost-saving features encourage employ-
ers and their employees to increase the number of fringe beneﬁt programs
and concomitant employer expenditures on these programs.
11.4.5 Better Industrial Relations
In section 11.3, I noted the relatively high share of nonstatutory fringe
beneﬁts in large ﬁrms in Japan. One reason for this phenomenon is that
larger ﬁrms want to have better industrial relations and so pay higher
fringe beneﬁts to their employees. Generous treatment, through better
housing facilities, health insurance, free lunches, cultural and athletic fa-
cilities, and so forth, attracts more qualiﬁed workers and reduces turnover.
The Role of Firms in Welfare Provision 327Firms can also expect to reap returns from the high motivation and hard
work of their employees. In addition, large ﬁrms hesitate to pay relatively
high wages because harmony in the industry is believed to be important.
These are the main reasons why large ﬁrms in Japan pay considerably high
proportions of compensation in the form of fringe beneﬁts. Trade unions
in these ﬁrms have responded positively to these beneﬁts. Thus, both em-
ployers and employees have been cooperative, as Tachibanaki and Noda
(2000) document.
11.5 Tax Incidence and Policy Issues
There are at least ﬁve important criticisms of high employer contribu-
tions to social security and nonstatutory fringe beneﬁts. First, high rates of
contribution increase labor costs in general, which is detrimental to the ﬁ-
nancial condition of a ﬁrm and thus to employment. Second, the increase
in labor costs may encourage ﬁrms to employ more capital-intensive tech-
niques. This is again harmful to employment. Third, and related to the sec-
ond point, labor-intensive industries are hurt more than capital-intensive
industries. Fourth, nonmanual workers (or skilled workers) will be pre-
ferred to manual workers (or unskilled workers) due to the wage ceiling
used in the determination of the contribution rate. Fifth, since beneﬁts of
welfare provision are enjoyed almost entirely by individual persons, it is
conceivable to relieve ﬁrms of their contributions to welfare provision. The
reduction in these contributions could be used to increase employment,
wages, or both.
The extremely important subject of payroll tax incidence must also be
considered here. It is crucial to understand who actually bears the burden
of employer contributions. Three cases are possible: (a) backward shifting,
in which a ﬁrm passes employer contributions (payroll taxes) on to its em-
ployees; (b) forward shifting, in which a ﬁrm passes the tax on to con-
sumers in the form of price increases; and (c) no shifting at all. The previ-
ous ﬁve propositions regarding the eﬀect of the ﬁrm contribution rate on
employment are made under the presumption that ﬁrms do not shift the
burden at all. When the direction and the degree of tax shifting are known,
these stories may have to be substantially modiﬁed. Several theoretical and
empirical results on payroll tax incidence follow.
11.5.1 Payroll Tax Incidence
In a competitive market, the incidence of a payroll tax depends upon two
parameters, the elasticities of labor supply and labor demand. If capital is
considered an additional factor input, the substitutability of capital and la-
bor also plays an important role. The common technique for estimating the
payroll tax incidence was initiated by Brittain (1972), who estimated a la-
bor demand equation derived from a production function. The eﬀect of a
328 Toshiaki Tachibanakipayroll tax is then estimated indirectly. This technique is based on a com-
mon understanding that payroll taxes are mostly borne by labor in the long
run because long-run labor supply is perfectly inelastic (or very inelastic).
Break (1974) found this to be mainly true for the United States. In other
words, it was believed that employer contributions were fully shifted back-
ward to workers’ real wages.
Feldstein (1974) proposes a model of payroll tax incidence that assumes
that labor supply is not necessarily inelastic. He also introduces a growth
dynamic into the model through capital accumulation. When estimates of
labor supply and labor demand elasticities are applied to this model, a
slightly diﬀerent result is obtained. For example, Beach and Balfour (1983)
use U.K. data to estimate that only 45 to 60 percent of payroll taxes are
shifted back to labor for prime-age males, and 14 to 19 percent for married
women. Since the labor supply elasticity of married women is very high—
say, 0.8 to 1.1, as compared to 0.08 to 0.20 for men—only a small portion
of their payroll tax is shifted back. Thus, the eﬀect of the payroll tax is
equally shared between wage loss and employment reduction for married
women, and the major eﬀect is on wages for men. Irish results tell a similar
story. Kirwan (1979) adopts a higher value of the elasticity of labor supply,
0.74, while Hughes (1985) uses a lower value, 0.21. The estimated results
on shifting turn out to be considerably diﬀerent. Consequently, a hypo-
thetical reduction in the employer contribution rate produces diﬀerent es-
timates of job creation for each elasticity estimate. These two studies
clearly show the importance of the labor supply elasticity in estimating the
incidence of the payroll tax as well as the number of jobs created or lost due
to changes in the rate of employer contributions.
Hamermesh (1979) estimates that 36 percent of the U.S. payroll tax is
borne by labor as lower wages (his study is restricted to white males). Al-
though his paper acknowledges the diﬀerences in labor supply elasticities
among demographic groups, he fails to incorporate such diﬀerences.
Rather, he emphasizes the adjustment process of labor demand and supply.
Extending the idea of the adjustment process, Hamermesh (1980) obtains
the result that the impact of a change in the payroll tax rate on wages is de-
layed for several years because the adjustment of both labor supply and la-
bor demand is not instantaneous. He then applies recently estimated val-
ues of the adjustment coeﬃcients to estimate his result.
Another important ﬁnding of Hamermesh (1980) is that the response to
a decrease in the payroll tax is much slower than the response to an in-
crease. This asymmetry arises from the fact that the adjustment of actual
to desired labor supply is slower than that of actual to desired labor de-
mand in the Barro-Grossman (1976) employment model he utilizes. The
Barro-Grossman employment model speciﬁes that actual employment
must be the minimum of labor supplied and demanded. This asymmetry
has an important policy implication: When the tax rate is increased, em-
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mand is the binding constraint); when the tax rate is decreased, employ-
ment increases only slowly because labor supply is the constraint. Thus, a
policy aimed at lowering the payroll tax rate in order to increase employ-
ment has only limited value, whereas increasing the tax rate is quite detri-
mental to employment.
Two reservations are forthcoming at this point. First, it may still be
worthwhile to decrease the payroll tax rate in order to increase employ-
ment in economies where the observed rate of unemployment is very high,
as is the case in several European nations. Second, it is necessary to keep in
mind that the supply elasticities for both men and women are considerably
higher in countries where the average tax burden (including both income
and payroll taxes) is relatively heavy (e.g., Blomquist 1983 on Sweden). In
such countries a downward adjustment in employment may be accom-
plished more quickly than is suggested by the model.
What is the incidence of the payroll tax in an economy in which both fac-
tor and product markets are imperfectly competitive? Unions may resist
the lowering of real wages in order to maintain real purchasing power.
Firms with monopoly power may raise product prices and pass on the tax
increases to consumers, that is, forward shifting. Leuthold (1975), among
others, tackles this problem for the United States. She concludes that labor
contracts and union actions eﬀectively prevent real wages from falling rap-
idly, but much work is needed to obtain a more conclusive result in this
ﬁeld.
In addition to the common technique described above, several authors
have applied another estimation method, a macroeconomic, or Phillips-
curve, approach. Perry (1970) proposes that an increase in employer con-
tributions did not lead to any decrease in wages. Gordon (1971), on the
contrary, suggests that employer contributions were shifted back to wages
entirely. Vroman (1974) shows a result somewhere in between. All of these
studies were conducted for the United States, and the results are quite var-
ied. Holmlund (1983) estimates the payroll tax incidence for Sweden using
a similar but more sophisticated method. He concludes that only a fraction
(roughly 40 percent) of postwar Swedish payroll tax increases were directly
shifted back onto labor as lower wage increases. He also ﬁnds that around
30 percent of employer contributions in the United States were shifted back.
In sum, studies of payroll tax incidence suggest that only a small portion
of employer contributions is shifted back onto labor. The degree depends
on many factors and is very sensitive to the elasticity parameters used.
However, it must be emphasized that only one study, Perry (1970), has
found no backward shifting at all. Some backward shifting almost cer-
tainly occurs.
It is somewhat strange that interest in the study of payroll tax incidence
has waned in recent years. I suggest the following two reasons for this.
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contributions is shifted back onto labor. Thus, there is no strong incentive
to add a new result. Second, several technical issues have not yet been
solved. Thus, unless a new estimation method is invented, a diﬀerent result
cannot be expected.
10.5.2 Incidence in Japan
My estimation method is discussed brieﬂy below. There are basically two
approaches to estimating payroll tax (i.e., employers’ contributions to so-
cial security) incidence. The ﬁrst is a time series estimation method, as uti-
lized by Hammermesh (1980), Beach and Balfour (1983), and Holmlund
(1983). The second is a cross-sectional estimation method (i.e., states and
occupations), as utilized by Gruber and Krueger (1991). Cross-sectional
analyses cannot be easily performed if a national-level social security sys-
tem applies uniformly to all ﬁrms and workers, unlike the American em-
ployer-provided health insurance system analyzed by Gruber and Krueger.
Since the Japanese social insurance system for employees is fairly univer-
sal for all ﬁrms and workers, I use a time series estimation method.
The basic method relies on the estimation of the demand for labor, as
shown, for example, by Beach and Balfour (1983). The demand for labor
under a generalized constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production
function is given by equation (1):
(1) Yi   [ 1(e iLi)(  1)/     2(e iKi)(  1)/ ] /(  1),
where Y is real output, L is man-hours of labor input, K is capital input,  
is the elasticity substitution between capital and labor,   and   are factor-
augmenting technical change parameters, and i speciﬁes the time period.
We can write the demand for labor by equating the marginal product of
labor to the real wage, as follows:
(2) ln Li      1T    2 ln(W/P)i∗    3 ln Yi∗   ui,
where T is a time-trend variable and ∗ implies the optimal level that is cal-
culated using the marginal productivity condition. Gross labor costs are
denoted by (W/P)(1   St) where W is the net wage, S(0 ≤ S ≤ 1) is the shift
parameter, and t is the payroll tax rate. If S is equal to 1 after estimation,
there is full backward shifting, implying that the presence of the payroll tax
lowers the net wage by the amount of the tax. If S is 0 there is no shifting,
implying that the net wage is not aﬀected by the payroll tax. The former sig-
niﬁes full oﬀsets, and the latter signiﬁes no eﬀect. In other words, the for-
mer implies that employees bear the entire burden of the payroll tax,
whereas the latter implies that employers bear the whole burden.
The demand for labor can thus be estimated by
(3) ln L1      1T    2 ln(W/P)i∗    2S ln(1   ti)∗    3 ln Yi∗   ui.
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  ti)∗, and ln Yi∗, because they are not observed. I do this by assuming a
rational-expectations framework, in which (W/P)i∗   ln(W/P)i–j, ln(1  
ti)∗   ln(1   ti–j), and ln Yi∗   ln Yi–j, where j denotes a lag. These values
can be estimated with the data.
The estimated result of Tachibanaki and Yokoyama (2002) suggests that
it is impossible to ﬁnd any signiﬁcant shifting except for a few cases of
samples divided by sex and industry. It implies that nearly all employers’
contributions to social security are borne by employers (i.e., ﬁrms). This
gives us important policy implications.
11.6 Recommendations for Japan
Our empirical result regarding the direction and degree of shifting of
employers’ contributions to social security in Japan suggests the following
policy implications. First, employers bear nearly the entire burden of ﬁrms’
contributions. Thus, if the society had a consensus such that ﬁrms should
be free from any contributions to social insurance, the portion paid by
ﬁrms to social insurance could be used freely for purposes other than ﬁrms’
contributions to social security.
Second, it is reasonable to expect that nearly all of social security bene-
ﬁts should be ﬁnanced by employees. This is true in particular when the
burden of employers’ contributions to social security is too high, damag-
ing the investment and employment activities of ﬁrms.
Third, Tachibanaki’s (1997b) proposal that ﬁrm contributions to social
security could be transformed into wage payments must be modiﬁed in
light of the incidence results. The proposal emphasizes that higher wages
enable employees to contribute more to social security, and they also pro-
vide greater freedom of consumption. Freedom of consumption implies
that the wage increase resulting from decreased employer contributions to
social security would be spent freely by employees. Great modiﬁcations to
this proposal, however, are necessary given the current ﬁnding that no ma-
jor part of ﬁrm contributions to social security are shifted to employees in
Japan.
There are three choices for such modiﬁcations. The ﬁrst choice is to
abandon or reduce ﬁrms’ contributions to social security if the burden is
believed to be too heavy, and thus to expect employees to accept a lower
level of social security beneﬁts. Since it is not desirable to lower beneﬁts,
someone would have to accept a higher ﬁnancial burden to compensate for
the reduction in social security contributions. I suppose that this group will
have to be all citizens. The second choice is that only nonstatutory fringe
beneﬁts should be transformed into wage payments. The third is to con-
sider a new ﬁnancing method for social security if employees are not will-
ing to accept lower social security beneﬁts.
My own preference is for a combination of the above choices, for the fol-
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butions to social security in order to allow ﬁrms to better concentrate on
their business activities. I add the fact that ﬁrms’ contributions to social se-
curity are likely to have a distortionary impact on labor allocations, as was
proposed previously.
Second, there is no strong justiﬁcation for believing that ﬁrms should be
responsible for the social security beneﬁts of workers. I believe that a ﬁrm’s
responsibility is to engage in prosperous economic activity and thus to
keep employment high, with possibly higher wages. Incidentally, self-
employed workers and farmers have no outside support like employer con-
tributions.
Third, it is desirable to have a social security system whose ﬁnancing is
borne by beneﬁciaries. One way to have such a system is to shift the basis
of the ﬁnancing method from a social insurance principle to a tax prin-
ciple. Okamoto and Tachnibanaki (2002) performed a simulation study
that proposed that the best ﬁnancing method is to introduce a nonlinear
(i.e., progressive) expenditure tax, replacing current social security contri-
butions paid by both employers and employees. “Best” here implies that
the impacts on both eﬃciency and equity were incorporated into the wel-
fare measure.
11.7 Concluding Remarks
This paper proposes that ﬁrms in Japan can withdraw from welfare pro-
vision. The concrete method is as follows: (a) a transformation of non-
statutory fringe beneﬁts to wage payments; (b) a withdrawal of ﬁrms’ statu-
tory social security contributions; and (c) an introduction of a progressive
expenditure tax to compensate for such a withdrawal.
I oﬀer several reasons why both employers and employees have preferred
nonwage payments in the past. It is technically necessary to discuss why
these reasons are no longer applicable in Japan. However, since Tach-
ibanaki (1997a,b) and the previous part of this paper engage in such a
discussion, here I only brieﬂy describe several items to supplement the jus-
tiﬁcations of my proposal.
First, the argument of the agency model is no longer applicable because
the basis of wage determination is shifting from the seniority system to the
merit system, and thus the age-wage proﬁle is ﬂattening.
Second, tax advantage theory has not been a driving force in Japan, un-
like in the United States, where preferential tax treatment encourages
American ﬁrms and workers to adopt employer-provided health insurance
and pension programs (see Tachibanaki 2000a) for the case of Japan).
Third, employers wish to reduce the burden of ﬁrm contributions to wel-
fare provision, as shown in appendix A. Also, employees want higher wage
payments, rather than nonstatutory fringe beneﬁts (appendix B), since
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vantages of nonstatutory fringe beneﬁts are greatest when there are few
turnovers.
Fourth, the Japanese industrial relations system is changing, and better
industrial relations can be achieved without relying on either nonwage pay-
ments or nonstatutory fringe beneﬁts. In other words, fair wage payments
and promotion systems are more important than generous fringe beneﬁts
for sustaining better industrial relations in Japan (see Tachibanaki 1997a
and Tachibanaki and Taki 2000 for details).
Finally, trade unions in Japan may be reluctant to accept my proposal
because union members are employed in large ﬁrms and are therefore the
biggest beneﬁciaries of the current ﬁrm-ﬁnanced system of welfare provi-
sion. Two recent phenomena are likely to mitigate this opposition. First,
the trade union participation rate is decreasing: It is currently only 22 per-
cent. Second, a large portion of both union and nonunion members now
accept the idea that their ultimate goal is to work and to receive fair wage
payments and do not expect the welfare provisions that have been oﬀered
by ﬁrms (see Tachibanaki and Noda 2000).
Appendix A
Firm Attitudes Toward Welfare Provision
This appendix presents results based on the Questionnaire on Welfare Pro-
visions survey, prepared by the Cultural Center for Life Insurance in 1998.
About 1,400 ﬁrms responded. This appendix references only a very small
portion of the questions asked in the survey.
One question asks the following: Does your ﬁrm increase (a) the share of
wages and bonuses, or (b) the share of welfare provision when revenue is
distributed? The distribution of each answer was (a), 14.6 percent; some-
what (a), 28.2 percent; indiﬀerent, 32.4 percent; somewhat (b), 18.7 per-
cent; and (b), 6.0 percent. The responses clearly indicate that ﬁrms prefer
to increase wages (total 42.8 percent) rather than welfare provision (total
24.7 percent).
Another question asks the following: Does (or will) your ﬁrm support
(a) or (b) regarding the role of welfare provision? Option (a) signiﬁes that
ﬁrms, rather than employees, are responsible for welfare provision, and (b)
signiﬁes that employees, rather than ﬁrms, should be responsible. The
questionnaire asks for a judgment on current status and future status sep-
arately.
The distribution of each answer is as follows: for current status, (a), 7.5
percent; somewhat (a), 22.4 percent; indiﬀerent, 31.1 percent; somewhat
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somewhat (a), 16.4 percent; indiﬀerent, 38.9 percent; somewhat (b), 27.4
percent; and (b), 11.0 percent. The responses indicate that the share of (b)
is considerably higher than the share of (a) for both current and future
judgment, suggesting that ﬁrms believe that employees, rather than ﬁrms,
should be responsible for welfare provision. The shift from the current
judgment to the future is minor; there is a small decrease in the “somewhat
(a)” category and an increase in the “indiﬀerent” group.
The ﬁnal question noted here concerns enterprise pension plans. The
question asks, is your ﬁrm interested in deﬁned contribution pension
plans? The distribution of answers is yes, 11.8 percent; no, 87.6 percent;
and no answer, 0.5 percent. It is surprising that the vast majority of ﬁrms
in Japan shows no interest in deﬁned contribution plans, unlike in the
United States, where they are very popular. The reasons deﬁned contribu-
tion plans are unpopular in Japan are explained in detail in Tachibanaki
(2000a).
Appendix B
Employee Preferences for Welfare Provision
The 1999 Survey on Life Plan(2000; sample size 1,350) found that the ratio
of nonstatutory, nonwage payments to nonstatutory fringe beneﬁt pay-
ments was 0.30, while the ratio of severance payments to enterprise pen-
sions paid was 0.70. One question asks employees the following: What
proportion would be ideal, if you had a chance to choose among (a) non-
statutory fringe beneﬁts, (b) severance payments and enterprise pensions,
and (c) wage payment? The answer was (a) 0.16, (b) 0.38, and (c) 0.46, im-
plying that employees would like to receive about 50 percent of nonstatu-
tory, nonwage payments as wages. These ﬁgures regarding employee pref-
erences strongly support my proposal that a large portion of nonwage
payments should be shifted to wages. Employees are less fond of receiving
nonstatutory fringe beneﬁts.
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